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The New International Economic
Order and the Law of the Sea
ELISABETH MANN BORGESE*
INTRODUCTION
The interrelationship between the development of the New
International Economic Order1 (NIEO) and the new law of the sea
(LOS) is a complex and inadequately studied subject. Because the
oceans play an important and rapidly expanding role in the
economic life of nations, it is impossible to build an NIEO without
including the oceans. The principles developed by the Sixth and
Seventh Special Sessions of the General Assembly and the Charter
* Associate, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, and Chair-
person, Planning Council of the International Ocean Institute, The Royal
University of Malta (Pacem in Maibus).
1. The goals of the NI.EO and the means to reach these goals have
been defined by a number of intergovernmental conferences and nongovern-
mental institutions. Among the former are the Sixth and Seventh Special
Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations which adopted a
Declaration, a Programme of Action, and a Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States; the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), Fourth Session, Nairobi, Kenya, 1976, which adopted a Report;
and the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned
Countries, Colombo, Ceylon, August 16-17, 1976, which adopted a series of
documents. The work of nongovernmental institutions includes the Report
of the Hammerskjold Foundation (1975) and the RIO Report (1976).
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of Economic Rights and Duties of States must be applied to States
and to the international community in their activities both in the
seas and on land, or no NIEO can come into existence.
Building new international institutions in the oceans, one of the
tasks of the United Nations Conference on LOS (UNCLOS), pro-
vides the first occasion to create an institutional framework to
embody the principles of the NIEO. The oceans, in a way, are our
great laboratory. This fact has been recognized by the leading
minds of the UNCLOS, from the Secretary-General of the United
Nations2 to Chairman Engo.3
Nevertheless the UNCLOS has done little toward building an
NIEO. Moreover, LOS and ocean management have almost dis-
appeared from the declarations adopted by actions of other forums
engaged in building the NIEO on land. The two developments
are moving on separate and often divergent tracks. This situation
is tragic for both the NIEO and the LOS.
There are several reasons for the divergence. First, LOS
appears to be a highly specialized and rather complicated matter,
mainly an exercise for lawyers, and most people engaged in the
general effort of building the NIEO simply have not done their
"homework" in LOS. Second, the bureaucratic division of labor
within States is such that integrating policies is difficult. This
2. Inaugurating the Fourth Session of the UNCLOS, the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations Dr. Kurt Waldheim said:
We will have lost a unique opportunity if the uses made of the
sea are not subjected to orderly development for the benefit of all,
and if the law of the sea does not succeed in contributing to a more
equitable global economic system. There is a broad and growing
public understanding and appreciation of the issues involved, and
the successful outcome of your work would also have a major im-
pact on the establishment and implementation of the new interna-
tional economic order .... It is not only the law of the sea that
is at stake. The whole structure of international cooperation will
be affected, for good or for ill, by the success or failure of this con-
ference.
3. In U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/L. 16, the Chairman of the First Committee
reminded the Conference that:
As I explained in the introduction to [Part I of the Informal Single
Negotiating Text] I worked in the light of the provisions contained
in the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the
Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdictional .... Also
of considerable importance for me was another international docu-
ment commanding wide universal support: the "Declaration on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order" adopted by
the General Assembly on 1 May 1974 at its sixth special session.
compartmentalization is so entrenched that even within the marine
sector of many governments, it is difficult to form a unified
policy. The divergent interests of shipping, mining, fishing, the
marine sciences, navigation, and the military are hard to reconcile.
Few countries have even begun to harmonize the marine sector as
a whole with the other sectors of international economic policy.
Third, the marine revolution (the penetration of the industrial revo-
lution into the oceans) is of such recent date that its far-flung impli-
cations are not generally understood.
The fourth reason for the separation between building the NIEO
and the LOS is the most serious: LOS has become a very contro-
versial, very divisive issue. As it has developed over the past few
years, it threatens to divide developing nations-coastal from land-
locked, mineral importing from mineral exporting, and Latin Amer-
ican from African. Yet these are the States which most need a
change in the structure of international relations and on whom both
the building of the NIEO and the LOS depend.
The LOS is that part of contemporary international law most ve-
hemently in flux. LOS is where new concepts are developing, such
as the "common heritage of mankind," which have a potentially rev-
olutionary impact and where time-honored concepts, such as those
of property and sovereignty, are being transformed and modernized.
Every issue that has to be dealt with by the makers of the NIEO
is reflected in the oceans.
INTERRELATIONSHIPS
Food
Few of the projections for increasing the world food production
to cope with the rising spectre of starvation and malnutrition take
into account the potential of the oceans. Presently, commercial
fisheries contribute only a small percent of the world food supply,
and this percent is decreasing rather than increasing because of
overfishing, mismanagement, and pollution. Hence ignoring the
potential of the oceans in these projections is generally thought to
be the correct approach. Yet, under a renewed LOS and with prop-
er management, conservation measures, and new technologies, food
from the oceans could be multiplied. For example, significant
potential exists in the so-called unconventional living resources,
plant and animal species that have not been exploited by traditional
fisheries but that can now be exploited, and in mariculture of all
kinds. The ancient Polynesians had a unified concept of food pro-
duction, ranging from dry land to wetlands and into the seas. Their
agriculture and their mariculture moved on the same level. How-
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ever, occidentals and moderns have fragmented this concept. And
worse, we have galloped with the agricultural leg into an industrial
and scientific age while remaining, with the maricultural leg, in
the primitive hunting stage. We have to learn to walk with both
legs again and to reunify the food production concept. This reunifi-
cation will be of enormous ecological importance. The ecological
impact of cultivating the oceans may be far less destructive than
the ecological impact of, for instance, deforesting the tropical rain
forests in order to increase food production. Also, the international
character of the ocean facilitates international participation in pro-
duction and distribution according to need. Ocean management
thus may establish new forms of international cooperation in food
production and distribution.
Energy
The real and lasting significance of the so-called energy crisis is
that we are moving from a fossil-fuel based economy to an economy
based on non-conventional, renewable energy resources. The great
question before us is: How does the energy revolution relate to re-
structuring the relations between developing and industrialized na-
tions? Will the energy revolution, like the preceding phases of tech-
nological revolution, benefit only the industrialized nations, thus
widening the gap between the poor and the rich?
The energy revolution is ocean oriented. The oceans play an
enormous and rapidly increasing role in the production, transporta-
tion, storage, and distribution of energy as well as in the disposal
of energy waste products. This statement applies to both conven-
tional and unconventional energy resources. The potential of the
latter-tides, waves, currents, thermogradients, chemical and bio-
logical processes-is enormous.
Physically, the oceans are a great equalizer, moderating the
climates and breaking the harshness of continental seasonal con-
trasts. Ocean management, conceived as an element of the NIEO,
can make the oceans a great equalizer also in economic and politi-
cal terms, mitigating the harshness of the land-based inequali-
ties among nations.
Transnational Enterprises
Nowhere are we faced with the challenge and the necessity of
creating a new institutional framework for the operation of the
transnational enterprises as directly as we are in the oceans. The in-
ternational mining consortia have to be structured into a new
framework of international cooperation which must enable them to
operate effectively while assuring the international community con-
trol through participation. Building this framework is indeed the
heart of the task now before the First Committee of the UNCLOS,
which may be nearing a breakthrough on the subject.
Miscellaneous Issues
To a large extent international trade is shipborne. Other areas
which also demonstrate the relationship between the NIEO and LOS
are policy and regional economic integration. One could go through
each of the issue areas on the program of actions and declaration
of principles of the various forums engaged in the building of the
NIEO and show their relationship to the new LOS.
FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION OF THE NIEO AND LOS RELATIONSHIP
Situations exist in which the UNCLOS can and must create new
forms of participation and cooperation in the management of the
common heritage of mankind. If these forms are successful in
ocean management, they can be adapted to other areas of inter-
national economic cooperation. There are also instances in which
the UNCLOS can succeed in solving its own problems only by tak-
ing them out of the narrow context of LOS and inserting them
into the wider one of building a NIEO. An example of the first
type of situation is the International Sea-bed Authority (ISA) and
its Enterprise. An example of the second type of situation is the
issue of the landlocked versus the coastal States.
The ISA's Enterprise
With regard to the ISA and its Enterprise, clearly as far as the
Single Negotiating Text 4 is concerned, the First Committee has
come to a deadlock.5 In somewhat blunt terms, the alternatives
4. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1/pt. 1 (1976).
5. "It would clearly be less than candid," the Chairman of the First
Committee reported to the closing plenary meeting, "to describe this as one
of our more productive sessions." He also stated: "If it was regrettable
that the First Committee failed at this session to make spectacular gains,
it was, nevertheless, entirely understandable and, if I may say so, both fore-
seeable and foreseen." The Committee, he said, had progressed as far as
it possibly could down its present road. "The time has come for the Com-
mittee to make a radical departure from its existing processes. At the heart
of our problems lie a number of basic and highly political questions that
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before us are one that is unworkable because it is unacceptable
and another that is unacceptable because it is unworkable.
On the one hand, the industrialized States' insistence on free ac-
cess to the resources of the area within the ISA's jurisdiction un-
der a so-called contract from the ISA amounts to a return to
the licensing system. This position reduces the ISA to a weak,
pro forma entity and relegates the concept of the common heri-
tage of mankind to the realm of rhetoric and myth. This al-
ternative is probably not acceptable to the majority of States and
is therefore not a workable option.
On the other hand, the position of the majority of developing
States advocating the Enterprise system in its present form is not
workable and therefore not acceptable.
One of the great challenges in building the ISA is to find a new
synthesis of economic and political processes. However, as the ISA
is constructed in the Revised Single Negotiating Text, these two
processes appear confused. The ISA is a political body, but it has
institutionalized, in its decisionmaking organs, interest groups:
poor and rich States, producers and consumers. The Enterprise,
which should be an economic, operational entity, is instead largely
a political body, duplicating the structure of the ISA itself. Like
the ISA, it is nonoperational and depends on "contracts" with
States and companies. The Enterprise is a costly and unwieldy
entity, not likely to be very effective.
But suppose that the ISA were much better than it is now. The
fact remains that it is not acceptable as the sole manager of the
common heritage of mankind either to the socialist States or to
the free-enterprise States: It is not acceptable to any of the States
having the technology and the capital necessary to start operations
on the seabed. Hence the search for a compromise. But can there
be a compromise between an unacceptable alternative and an un-
workable alternative? Such a compromise probably would be both
unworkable and unacceptable.
The parallel system, proposed by the United States and other
industrialized nations is such a compromise. Under the parallel
have to be answered before any actual drafting of a compromise text can
be undertaken in good faith, and these questions should be answered at the
highest political level."
system both the ISA's Enterprise and States and their companies
would operate under equal terms within the ISA. This structure
places the Enterprise in a position of competition which it simply
cannot sustain; it also makes the Enterprise unnecessary. If the
States and companies having the technology and the means are free
to mine all the minerals they need for their own use and for inter-
national trade, where is the incentive for the international commu-
nity to pour aid into an artificial "Enterprise?" Former Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger's offer to "finance the Enterprise" in
return for the acceptance of free access to States and their com-
panies means, in simple terms, to try to buy such free access-
which, of course, may be worth quite a lot. In addition, it means
offering to pay for private profits with public funds. But that is
not all. The parallel system also completely changes the signifi-
cance of the ISA's Enterprise.
The ISA's Enterprise was to embody a new form of active,
participatory cooperation among industrialized and developing
countries. Sharing in the common heritage of mankind was to
replace the humiliating concept of foreign aid. This sharing was
to be the historic significance of the Enterprise.
Now, by a slight of hand, we are faced with a completely
different concept. The industrialized States and their companies
"do their own thing." They take what they need or want on the
basis of free access, provided merely with a "contract" which the
ISA cannot refuse. The ISA's Enterprise becomes the status
symbol of the poor, depending once more on aid from the rich
nations and grant-giving institutions. Do the poor nations really
need this kind of aid? There might even be more useful ways to
spend such aid money than on deep-seabed mining which is cer-
tainly not something developing nations need most.
Thus the parallel system in any form or fashion or disguise is
unacceptable and unworkable. This fact means that on this one
point we really need a fresh start-a breakthrough. Both alter-
natives have to be abandoned.
Here the question arises: What is an Enterprise? Is it a build-
ing? Must it be a fixed structure that needs to be maintained even
when it is not operational? Or can it be conceived as something
functional and operational-something that ceases when its func-
tion or operation ceases? Perhaps the second concept is more
practical, more economical. An Enterprise, in this case, would be
established only in the context of precise projects of exploration
and exploitation. There would not be only one Enterprise, but
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rather, between now and 1985, perhaps a dozen. These Enterprises
need not be restricted to mineral mining; they might engage in
other marine activities. The structure and function of the ISA's
Enterprises, according to this concept, might be described approxi-
mately as follows:
1. Enterprises operating in the area must operate under a
charter from the ISA.
2. Enterprises under a charter from the ISA are governed by
a board whose members are appointed in the following manner:
(a) At least one-half plus one of the members are appointed
by the Assembly of the ISA, upon the recommendation of the Coun-
cil, in accordance with Article 28(2) (iii). In its appointments, the
Assembly gives special regard to the participation of developing
countries and of organizations representing consumers and labor.
(b) Up to one-half minus one of the members are appointed
by States parties or State enterprises or persons natural or juridical
which possess the nationality of States parties or are effectively
controlled by them or their nationals, or any group of the fore-
going, in proportion to their investment in the Enterprise.
3. The ISA must provide at least fifty-one percent of the invest-
ment capital for any Enterprise operating under a charter from the
ISA.
4. Profits are apportioned between the ISA and the others
in proportion to their investment-that is, the ISA receives at least
fifty-one percent of all profits.
0
6. See A. PARDO & E. BORGESE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMC
ORDER AND THE LAW OF THE SE& (2d ed. 1976). In this study we ex-
amined in detail the questions of investment, operational costs, and reve-
nue for the ISA. The total investment for all Enterprises projected
until 1985 is on the order of one billion dollars, of which the ISA would
have to provide 51%; obviously the only way to control the production
in the area is to control investment and decisionmaking. Five hundred mil-
lion dollars could be obtained from the World Bank alone under the circum-
stances here envisaged. Also the money could be obtained partly from the
World Bank and partly from some other sources. The problem is not finan-
cial but rather political. By 1985, the revenue to the ISA under this system
would be well over one-half billion dollars. This is a respectable amount,
but it is not so much the money that constitutes the advantage of this pro-
posed system. Even if the revenue were smaller-and projecting these reve-
nues is difficult in the light of present uncertainties-other advantages
would remain.
5. Enterprises have an international legal responsibility and
such legal capacity as is necessary for the performance of their
functions and the fulfillment of their purposes. Enterprises func-
tion in accordance with their statutes.7
6. Enterprises have their principal seat at the seat of the ISA
or at any of the regional centers or offices established by the
ISA.8
The advantages of this system are several.9 First, the proposed
system would effectively separate business from politics. The
Enterprises would really be Enterprises, not political bodies. They
would represent interest groups-investors and producers (in pro-
portion to their investment), consumers, developing nations, man-
agement, and labor. Thus the representation of interest groups in
the ISA's Council could be avoided. For example, representation
might be based simply on the criterion of regional balance. The
Council would be a political organ-not half business, half politics.
Second, all production in the area would be effectively brought
under the management of the ISA, which would control decision-
making and investment in all Enterprises and would receive over
half the profits from all production. The proposal introduces
7. See, e.g., the Statute for European Companies. The Statute of the
Enterprise will have to be considerably more complex than the one now
proposed in the Revised Single Negotiating Text. It will have to contain
an enforceable code of conduct for multinational companies as well as de-
tailed provisions for technology transfer, a description of the structure of
the (joint venture) Enterprise, voting procedures, and financial arrange-
ments.
8. Regional centers or offices are provided for in Article 20 (4) of the
of the U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1/pt. I (1976).
9. In his paper, Sea-bed Mining: Establishment of an "Enterprise,"
presented at Pacem in Maribus VII in Algiers, October 25-28, 1976, Ambas-
sador C.W. Pinto of Sri Lanka had the following comment:
Finally, in the context of contractor or partner financing as con-
trasted with financing of the Enterprise itself, it has been sug-
gested that instead of concentrating on efforts to bring into being
and finance an autonomous operational arm like the Enterprise,
one might contemplate mining under a uniform system of equityjoint ventures. Where an applicant was accepted by the Authority
for participation with it in seabed mining, the Authority and the
other entity would bring into being through procedures to be
provided for under the Treaty, a new enterprise, a new interna-
tional personality, which would itself then be authorised to bor-
row or by other agreed means obtain the necessary financing.
Thus neither the Authority nor any of its organs nor, indeed thejoint venture partner, would be directly involved in the question
of financing. Under this system there would be no need for a
single organ called the Enterprise. On the other hand, the system
would spawn several "Enterprises"-as many enterprises in fact
as there were seabed mining ventures. This system certainly offers
many advantages and should be considered in greater depth.
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a unified system, which is, nevertheless, quite flexible. It includes
the possibility-if and when the ISA has the capital, the tech-
nology, the managerial capacity, and the desire-of creating an
Enterprise or Enterprises fully financed and controlled by the ISA.
Although the ISA will probably not establish such an Enterprise,
at least during the next twenty-five years, this point is crucially
important in making the system acceptable to the developing
States. The advantage of the proposed system to the developing
States is that if they do not now choose to establish an ISA owned
and controlled Enterprise, activities do not switch to the other
track of a parallel system, thereby railroading a licensing system.
Rather, they remain in a unified system which the ISA manages on
a sliding scale ranging from fifty-one percent to one-hundred per-
cent control.
Third, the problem of how to finance the Enterprise would be
solved. Half the capital and technology would come automati-
cally with the consortia and State enterprises applying for a
charter. This fact, together with the fact that the resource (value
of the nodules in situ) is the common heritage of mankind, vested
in the ISA, would be a sufficient guarantee for the World Bank and
other institutions to advance the remaining needed capital.
Fourth, the proposed system advances the goal of bringing multi-
national corporations under public international control, a need
keenly felt by the international community. The pattern it
provides of participatory cooperation between rich and poor
nations could subsequently be applied to other enterprises. Thus,
a new ISA would be a significant step in the direction of building
an NIEO.
During the final meeting of the fifth session of the UNCLOS,
Nigeria introduced a proposal in the First Committee. As Chair-
man Engo stated in his final report to the Conference, Nigeria
suggested "in effect a joint venture system applying to all activities
of exploration and exploitation in the Area; this . . .would avoid
the problem of the types of relationships proposed between the
Authority on the one hand and States and private parties on the
other."10
10. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/L. 16 (1976).
The Nigerian proposal, which consists of thirteen paragraphs,
provides that States parties, persons natural or juridical, have a
right to enter into a joint venture with the ISA and that the ISA
shall be an effective partner to the joint venture. This proposal,
it has been reported, met with the approval of former Secretary
of State Kissinger. Thus a breakthrough is possible. The Conces-
sion the industrialized States would have to make is accepting the
however theoretical possibility of the ISA's establishing an Enter-
prise which it wholly controlled and owned. The concession the
developing States would have to make is rethinking their concept
of the Enterprise and accepting its transformation from a rigid,
structural concept to a functional, operational one.
If a breakthrough on this point could be made during the next
session of the UNCLOS, the work of the First Committee could
probably be successfully concluded within the year. A break-
through in the First Committee, furthermore, would be a break-
through for the UNCLOS as a whole. One of the points that
became clear during the last session was that the success or failure
of the First Committee will determine the success or failure of the
UNCLOS.
Let us now look at the second type of situation-that in which the
UNCLOS is not in a position to lead in building the NIEO but
rather depends on its being built by other forums and in which
the UNCLOS can solve its own problems only in the wider context
of the development of the NIEO.
Landlocked States
In this wider context it is quite possible that the hopeless con-
frontation between landlocked and geographically disadvantaged
nations on the one hand and coastal States on the other which
characterizes and endangers the present stage of negotiations at the
UNCLOS will completely change its nature over the next ten to
twenty-five years. To achieve this change, a slightly different per-
spective is needed. Obviously it is difficult, if at all possible, to
resolve this conflict within the narrowly circumscribed framework
of the UNCLOS, in which one group (the landlocked States) makes
only demands and the other group is supposed to make only conces-
sions. This framework obviously is not conducive to negotiations.
If, however, the conflict is taken out of this narrow framework and
inserted into the wider context of the NIEO, the problem be-
comes soluble. One goal of the plan of action for the NIEO is re-
gional economic integration in which all States of a region benefit
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from, and make concessions to, a common economic policy and in
which landlocked States have the same rights in all economic activi-
ties as do other members of the economic community. In the Euro-
pean Economic Community, which, despite its difficulties, is the
world's most advanced example of economic regional integration,
the citizens of any State, including the only landlocked one, Luxem-
bourg, have the right to fish in the waters under the jurisdiction
of any other member State.'
With regard to the continental shelf, landlocked and geographi-
cally disadvantaged States, at least conceptually, have no special
problems. Under the provisions of freedom of establishment, no
discrimination may exist against the enterprises of any member
country on the continental shelf of any other. Obviously, a number
of problems remain to be solved.12
However, there is no problem regarding free transit, which is
assured by the Treaty of Rome, and the Community "does have
a potential field of activity by virtue of the powers which it may
take in relation to the 'sea transport' (Article 84 (2)), although it
has not yet acted under the provision of this Article."' 3
This solution is obviously correct, but it can be accomplished only
in the wider framework of building an NIEO through regional
economic integration. Regional economic communities, customs
unions and common markets already exist in Africa and Latin
America, and in the future they will play an increasingly important
role. The European Economic Community has already decided to
become a party to LOS Convention,14 and other regional organiza-
11. European Community, Background, U.N. Doc. 1/1976 (1976):
The Community has established a common policy in the fisheries
sector, which includes a common organization of the market in fish-
eries products and the application of common rules with respect
to fishing in maritime waters under the sovereignty or jurisdiction
of member States. Discussions are now being held within the Com-
munity on the future of the common fisheries policy in the light
of the creation of 200-mile zones. The Community is in particular
examining the arrangements to be made, on a Community basis,
in order to ensure the pooling, sharing, conservation and exploita-
tion of the biological resources of the single area formed by the
future economic zones of the member States.
12. Vignes, The EEC and the Law of the Sea, in III NEW DIREcTIONS IN
THE LAW OF THE SEA (Churchill, Simmonds & Welch eds. 1973).
13. Id.
14. European Community, supra note 11.
tions will undoubtedly follow this example. Instead of trying to
solve all problems of the relationship between landlocked and
coastal nations globally, the UNCLOS could recommend that these
regional organizations solve problems within a geographically more
specific and economically more comprehensive context.
CONCLUSION
Fully integrating the work of the UNCLOS into the work of
building the NIEO must neither distract the UNCLOS from its
own urgent tasks nor cause it to attempt to solve all the world's
problems and thus to resolve nothing. The issue is a concep-
tual problem of direction, goal, and purpose. In some areas the
UNCLOS may indeed lead in the process of building the new
order. In other areas, where it must depend on other organiza-
tions to build the order, the very recognition of this dependence
may facilitate compromises at the UNCLOS. In both cases the join-
ing of the issues would enhance the building of the NIEO and
the LOS, for the two concepts potentiate each other. In contrast
the disjoining of the issues is fatal for both the NIEO and the
LOS.
